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INTRODUCTION 
In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, activists and advocates have 
rightly focused their attention on the immediate need to decrease the number 
of people in jails and prisons.1  Jails and prisons have been ravaged by the 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School.  I would like to thank participants in 
the NIU Criminal Law Works-in-Progress workshop, Geoffrey Bickford, Russell Covey, 
Lucian Dervan, Sarah Dobson, Margaret Maffai, Kristina McKenna, Dale Rappaneau, Cheryl 
Saniuk-Heinig, and Jenia Iontcheva Turner. 
 1  Emily Widra & Peter Wagner, Jails and Prisons Have Reduced Their Populations in 
the Face of the Pandemic, but not Enough to Save Lives, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 5, 
2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/08/05/jails-vs-prisons-update-2/ [https://per
ma.cc/7TBK-2X8D]. 
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virus and defendants are at real risk of illness or death in those spaces.2  But 
as the crisis continues and the backlog of criminal cases grows, defendants 
face additional risks.  This essay focuses on one such risk: the heightened 
risk for coerced and false pleas during the crisis. 
The vehicle by which the criminal system resolves most criminal 
cases—the plea bargain3—is ripe for abuse and overuse in the best of times.  
Unfortunately, now is far from the best of times, and as I outline here, there 
are several reasons why the usual risk factors for coercive plea bargaining 
are exacerbated during this public health crisis.  Furthermore, despite recent 
efforts to reform the plea system, the pandemic risks entrenching many of the 
most negative characteristics of plea bargaining even more deeply. 
Quite simply, the coercive nature of plea bargaining will get worse in a 
system that is backlogged and unable to hold jury trials for several months.  
Many states are not counting the delays caused by the coronavirus toward a 
defendant’s speedy trial clock, which means the cases can remain active for 
long periods of time and without any risk to the prosecutor that the case will 
be dismissed for lack of prosecution.4  For a defendant in this backlogged 
system, with a case hanging over her head and a speedy trial clock without 
finality, the plea will be her only option. In such an environment, coercive 
pleas can and will flourish. 
This essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I of the essay discusses the 
particular concerns related to coercive plea bargaining during the COVID-19 
crisis.  Part II offers solutions to these issues and suggests that this moment 
may provide opportunities for creative problem-solving capable of outlasting 
the virus.  Finally, Part III discusses some silver linings of the crisis for the 
criminal system at large and the practice of plea bargaining in particular.  
Like many other recent pieces about the impact of coronavirus on the 
criminal justice system,5 this essay addresses the current crisis in the hopes 
 
 2 Katie Park & Tom Meagher, A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons, 
MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-
at-coronavirus-in-prisons#staff-cases [https://perma.cc/P6GG-L7VG]. 
 3 Ninety to ninety-five percent of guilty pleas are resolved through guilty plea. Lindsey 
Devers, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH SUMMARY: PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING 1 (2011), 
https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/PleaBargainingResearchSu
mmary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SXJ-6QXW]. 
 4 See infra Part I.2. 
 5 See, e.g., Matthew Bender, Unmuted: Solutions to Safeguard Constitutional Rights in 
the Virtual Courtroom and How Technology Can Expand Access to Counsel and 
Transparency in the Criminal Justice System, 66 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3672441; Susan Bandes & Neal 
Feigenson, Virtual Trials: Necessity, Invention, and the Evolution of the Courtroom, 68 
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that it will teach us important lessons about the system more broadly.  By 
seeing some of the worst parts of the system exposed through COVID-19, 
we may be able to better meet future challenges and tackle some of the 
underlying daily injustices of the modern criminal process. 
I. THE RISK FACTORS FOR COERCIVE PLEAS DURING AND AFTER 
COVID-19 
There are three broad categories of concern for the misuse and abuse of 
plea bargaining during this crisis: 1) the even greater coercive force of a 
prison or jail sentence during a pandemic, 2) the difficulty with holding—or 
complete lack of—jury trials, and 3) issues with access to counsel.  These 
areas overlap in many ways, but defining these categories allows one to 
explore the challenges that defendants will face during and after this crisis. 
A. THE EVEN GREATER COERCIVE POWER OF A PRISON OR JAIL 
SENTENCE DURING A PANDEMIC 
 1. Pretrial Detention and Incarceratory Sentence as Potential Death 
Sentence 
A regular feature of the criminal system is the pretrial detention of 
defendants who cannot afford bail.  For many decades, this practice has been 
criticized for coercing defendants into accepting pleas.6  People are, of 
course, inclined to avoid sitting in a jail cell under any circumstances, even 
where they may be innocent and could launch a defense.  Recent studies 
indicate that pretrial detention increases the risks of a false plea 
substantially.7 
 
BUFFALO L. REV. 5 (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3683408; Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Unmasking Demeanor, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 
158 (2020); Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19, 115 NW. U.L. REV. 
ONLINE 59 (2020), https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?a
rticle=1291&context=nulr_online&preview_mode=1&z=1596157754; Benjamin Levin, 
Criminal Law in Crisis, U. COLO. L. REV. (2020), https://lawreview.colorado.edu/?p=627; 
Jenia I. Turner, Remote Criminal Justice, TEX. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3699045; Melanie D. Wilson, The Pandemic 
Juror, U. TENN. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 401 (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678923. 
 6 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF 
LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 20–31 (2010), https://www.hrw
.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/39EL-2HTZ]. 
 7 See Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Freedom Now or a Future Later: Pitting 
the Lasting Implications of Collateral Consequences against Pretrial Detention in Decisions 
to Plead Guilty, 24 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 204, 213–14 (2018) (reviewing the results of 
the authors’ study finding that pretrial detention increases the likelihood that even innocent 
people will plead guilty). 
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During the pandemic, the risk of false or coerced pleas is amplified.  The 
COVID-19 crisis makes jails and prisons—already unsafe spaces—
particularly treacherous because they are hotspots for viral spread.8  As Jenny 
Carroll notes, COVID-19 has highlighted the many failings of the pretrial 
detention system.9  She writes, “[i]n the midst of a public health crisis, 
pretrial detention determinations raise more than the possibility of 
confinement, indignity, and [] downstream consequences []; these decisions 
raise the possibility that a person will be exposed to a known fatal contagion 
as a result of an accusation.”10  A prison or jail sentence poses similar risks, 
and there have already been thousands of cases of COVID-19 in jails and 
prisons across the nation and 1,276 deaths, including of several young, 
otherwise healthy individuals.11  The number of cases and deaths in the 
nation’s jails and prisons rise daily.12  In addition to these risks, many states 
are struggling with a lack of alternatives to pretrial detention.  For example, 
as The Appeal reported, a shortage of ankle monitors has resulted in many 
people staying in jail, even when a court has ordered home detention.13 
And prosecutors know all of this.  There have been disturbing anecdotal 
reports of state prosecutors threatening defendants by holding out a plea 
bargain as the defendant’s only way to avoid incarceration and potential 
exposure to coronavirus.14  As the crisis continues and the coronavirus 
sweeps through more jails and prisons, more defendants will decide to plead 
guilty rather than risk exposure to the virus while incarcerated pretrial, 
 
 8 Anna Flagg, Jails Are Coronavirus Hotbeds. How Many People Should Be Released to 
Slow The Spread?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 3, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features
/jails-are-coronavirus-hotbeds-how-many-people-should-be-released-to-slow-the-spread/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZQZ5-NYTA].  
 9  Carroll, supra note 5. 
 10 Id. at 72. 
 11 See Park & Meagher, supra note 2.  Throughout the country, as of October 24, 2020, 
152,955 people in prison have tested positive for COVID-19 and 1,276 people in prison have 
died from the illness. Id.  In addition, there have been 34,188 cases of coronavirus reported 
among prison staff and 86 reported deaths. Id. 
 12 See id. 
 13 Kira Lerner, Amid One of the Nation’s Worst Coronavirus Outbreaks, a Shortage of 
Ankle Monitors Kept Some People in Jail, THE APPEAL (June 2, 2020), https://theappeal.
org/chicago-cook-county-jail-coronavirus-ankle-monitors-shortag/ [https://perma.cc/48XB-
2U2J]. 
 14 @RadleyBalko, TWITTER (Mar. 16, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://twitter.com/radleybalko
/status/1239657752001236992?s=20 [https://perma.cc/3H9T-V6AY]; Jolie McCullough & 
Emma Platoff, Coronavirus Pauses Many Texas Court Proceedings. For Some, That Means 
More Time in Jail, THE TEX. TRIB., Mar. 19, 2020, https://www.texastribune.org/2020/03/
19/texas-courts-coronavirus-jury-trials-defense-attorneys/ [https://perma.cc/Y9WE-NZGU] 
(citing a defense attorney who said that at least one local prosecutor “who tried to use fear of 
catching the virus in jail to sway a defendant to take the offer already on the table”). 
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regardless of their innocence15 or their ability to launch a successful 
challenge of their case. 
These same fears affect those who are not incarcerated and awaiting 
trial: rather than risk time incarcerated, these individuals may take a plea 
since it could mean serving a home confinement sentence during the crisis,16 
or they may be willing to take a non-incarceratory sentence rather than 
fighting the case and potentially ending up in a prison overrun by COVID-
19. 
The coronavirus crisis highlights how seldom conditions of 
confinement are brought up at sentencing and how unusual this is.17  The 
virus makes it impossible to ignore the reality of where we send people when 
they are sentenced or held pretrial, because these forms of segregation now 
come with risks of exposure to a potentially fatal illness.  And because of the 
pervasive nature of plea bargaining, these conditions—and the very real 
likelihood of death by COVID-19—may become another bargaining chip in 
the plea negotiation. 
2. Waivers 
Waivers are a common part of the plea process.  When a defendant 
pleads guilty, the defendant gives up rights typically associated with taking 
a plea, like the right to proceed to trial.  But the defendant often gives up 
many additional rights, such as the right to appeal or the right to receive 
Brady material.18  These waivers showcase the power of the government to 
set the terms of the plea agreement. And a prosecutor’s insertion of waivers 
into a plea deal reminds us of the fact that plea bargains are contracts of 
adhesion. 
 
 15 Edkins & Dervan, supra note 7. 
 16 There is some speculation that this is the reason Lori Loughlin, the actress awaiting trial 
in the college admissions scandal, decided to plead guilty after months of holding out for trial.  
She will be sentenced to two months in jail, and some speculate that she will be able to serve 
the sentence at home rather than in a federal facility because of the coronavirus. Josh Barro & 
Ken White, Should Joe Scarborough Sue President Trump, LRC PRESENTS: ALL THE 
PRESIDENT’S LAWYERS PODCAST, at 30:51 (May 27, 2020), https://www.kcrw.com
/news/shows/lrc-presents-all-the-presidents-lawyers/should-joe-scarborough-sue-president-
trump [https://perma.cc/WFK6-MB3J]. 
 17 Levin, supra note 5. 
 18 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (finding the Constitution does not 
require the Government to disclose material impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea 
agreement with a criminal defendant); see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 952, 960–66 (2012) (discussing the use of plea waivers to bar defendants from 
requesting future DNA testing). 
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During this crisis, we are seeing ways in which prosecutors are requiring 
defendants to waive specific rights related to COVID-19 in order to secure 
the benefit of the plea.  In Northern California, the U.S. Attorney requested 
that some defendants waive any compassionate release requests for 180 
days.19  A district court judge ultimately struck down the waiver provision in 
a powerful decision,20 but the mere fact that the US attorneys attempted such 
a waiver indicates the degree of latitude the parties have in negotiating pleas 
and showcases the power of the prosecutor in setting the terms of a plea 
bargain. 
Still other prosecutors have been attempting to secure plea bargains via 
letters sent directly to defendants.  In one such letter in Maine, a local 
prosecutor’s office offered–in light of the pandemic–to resolve a drunk 
driving case via a form the defendant would fill out and return by mail.21  The 
offer included a sentence of 48 hours in jail and a fine, and although it noted 
that the defendant could consult with an attorney, it did not require such 
consultation. 22  Such a resolution would allow a defendant to give up the 
constitutional right to counsel before accepting a jail sentence without any 
appropriate waiver of that right.23  Furthermore, the offer expired about a 
month after the letter was sent and contained language that the defendant 
could not “argue for [a] less” serious offer,24 a move that could result in an 
uncounseled defendant feeling pressured to accept the offer in the letter rather 
than lose out on any deal in the future. 
This sample of waivers demonstrates just how broadly prosecutors are 
interpreting their power to impose waivers of constitutional and procedural 
rights on defendants during the pandemic, making it nearly impossible for 




 19 See generally United States v. Sembrano, No. 19-cr-00651-CRB-1, 2020 WL 3161003, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2020); see also Order Rejecting Plea Agreement, United States v. 
Osorto, 445 F. Supp. 3d 103, 104–05 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2020) (No. 19-cr-00381-CRB-4). 
 20 Sembrano, 2020 WL 3161003 at *2 (“[T]he fact that the Government appropriately and 
often successfully opposes compassionate release motions on the merits does not explain why 
defendants should waive their right to bring such a motion at all. If the Government can oppose 
– and courts can deny – motions for compassionate release on the merits, why is it also 
necessary for defendants to waive or limit their right to move for compassionate release before 
the merits of such a motion are knowable.”) 
 21 Letter to Todd Collins, Office of the District Attorney, Aroostook County, Re: New 
Language in DA’s Office Plea Recommendation, June 26, 2020 (on file with author). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972). 
 24 Letter to Todd Collins, supra note 21. 
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B. THE DIFFICULTY OF HOLDING OR COMPLETE LACK OF JURY 
TRIALS 
1. No Jury Trials 
Even before the crisis, we were living in a country with nearly no trials, 
and the negative effects of a lack of trials are many: less development of the 
law, fewer opportunities to develop a case’s factual record, fewer 
opportunities for juries to review the decisions of prosecutors—the list goes 
on.25  Because of the public health crisis, in most jurisdictions there were no 
jury trials during the spring and summer of 2020,26 although some 
jurisdictions did have limited jury trials–both live and online–during the 
summer.27  The fall of 2020 saw more courts attempting to hold trials with 
mixed results.  For instance, Maine’s first attempt to hold an in-person 
criminal jury trial was scrapped after a witness’s child reported COVID-19 
symptoms.28  The status of the jury trial continues to evolve, but it is unlikely 
things will go back to any version of normal for many months (even in the 
very best scenario). 
The lack of jury trials makes sense from a public health perspective.  
Indeed, even the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys has 
stated that holding criminal jury trials during the pandemic would be 
“reckless and irresponsible,” and the “understandable fear, panic, and 
 
 25 Robert J. Conrad Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From 
Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 157–61 (2018). 
 26 Coronavirus and the Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/
newsroom/public-health-emergency [https://perma.cc/WG4M-6SB3] (last visited Sept. 20, 
2020) (showing statewide jury trial restrictions for each state and indicating that even as of 
September 2020, many states were still postponing jury trials). 
 27 See, e.g., Andrew Wolfson, A Jury Social Distanced Through an 8-Week Trial as 
COVID-19 Raged. Here’s How They Did it, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Apr. 26, 2020), 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/crime/2020/04/26/federal-jury-sits-through-8-
week-trial-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/3028236001/ [https://perma.cc/M5QC-XRTN] 
(discussing Kentucky trials); Max Mitchell, Ohio’s First Post-COVID Jury Trial was Set to 
Begin. Then the Defendant Nearly Collapsed, LAW.COM (Apr. 29, 2020, 6:48 PM), 
https://www.law.com/2020/04/29/ohios-first-post-covid-jury-trial-was-set-to-begin-then-the-
defendant-nearly-collapsed/?slreturn=20200509051618 [https://perma.cc/Y7E7-CZC4] 
(discussing Ohio trials); Justin Jouvenal, Justice by Zoom: Frozen Video, a Cat – and Finally 
a Verdict, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-
issues/justice-by-zoom-frozen-video-a-cat--and-finally-a-verdict/2020/08/12/3e073c56-
dbd3-11ea-8051-d5f887d73381_story.html [https://perma.cc/6RYE-CDJ8] (discussing 
Texas’s first online criminal trial). 
 28 Megan Gray, Maine’s First Mid-Pandemic Jury Trial Postponed Because of Possible 
COVID-19 Exposure, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.pressherald.co
m/2020/09/15/court-postpones-first-mid-pandemic-jury-trial-because-of-possible-covid-19-
exposure/ [https://perma.cc/J2EP-FZA9]. 
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uncertainty” stemming from the pandemic would “undermine the truth-
seeking purpose of trials.”29  As Melanie Wilson has noted, forcing jurors to 
attend trials during a pandemic is an extension of the system’s often cruel 
treatment of jurors and will serve to undermine the trial function since jurors 
may likely rush to judgment to limit their potential exposure to COVID-19.30 
But other types of danger abound in an extended period without trials, 
particularly for defendants who are sitting in jail awaiting trial.31  While 
many scholars have pushed back on the idea that plea bargains occur in the 
“shadow of the trial,”32 at least some plea bargaining happens with the idea 
that a trial could occur.  For instance, defendants who want to avoid 
immigration consequences may opt for trial when no immigration-safe plea 
bargain is on the table.33  Or when the parties cannot reach a resolution on 
the appropriate sentence, a defendant may wish to proceed to trial.  And, of 
course, innocent defendants may want a trial if the prosecutor refuses to drop 
the case.  However, with limited trials taking place and, as I explain below, 
a hold on speedy trial clocks, plea bargaining is the only option for resolving 
a case—a situation that only works for the prosecutor’s benefit.  This is what 
Thomas Maher recently called “plea bargaining in the shadow of COVID-
19.”34 
Additionally, as live jury trials resume, the health safety protocols 
needed to reduce the spread of COVID-19 will make the trial so burdensome 
that there will likely be fewer held.  An August 2020 opinion by Judge Gary 
R. Brown of the Eastern District of New York walked through the myriad 
 
 29 NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., CRIMINAL COURT REOPENING AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
IN THE COVID-19 ERA 8 (June 2, 2020), https://nacdl.org/getattachment/56802001-1bb9-
4edd-814d-c8d5c41346f3/criminal-court-reopening-and-public-health-in-the-covid-19-
era.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKA7-D5GW]. 
 30 Wilson, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 31 Although it is outside the scope of this essay, the canceling of grand juries during the 
coronavirus raises other concerns about unfairness to defendants. Simone Weichselbaum, 
Can’t Make Bail, Sit in Jail Even Longer Thanks to Coronavirus, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(May 1, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/can-t-make-bail-
sit-in-jail-even-longer-thanks-to-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/F53S-A72C]. 
 32 The seminal article questioning the “shadow of trial” theory of plea bargaining is 
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 
(2004). 
 33 Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2017) (finding that defendants, even 
when they are offered a favorable plea deal, may opt for trial where they face serious 
immigration consequences). 
 34 Thomas Maher, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of COVID-19, DUKE L. CSJ BLOG (May 
19, 2020), https://sites.law.duke.edu/csj-blog/2020/05/19/plea-bargaining-in-the-shadow-of-
covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/GGU3-NYGW]. 
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challenges of in-person criminal jury trials.35  As Judge Brown noted, the 
typical safety protocols—wearing face masks, social distancing, temperature 
screenings, and the like—are probably insufficient to protect trial-goers since 
most trials require hours of close contact among the participants.36  Those 
trials that do occur will be plagued with issues that decrease the chances of a 
fair trial for the defendant.  For instance, in addition to jurors needing to 
maintain social distance, lawyers will likely have to remain socially distant 
from one another and from their clients.  This will make communication 
between the defense attorney and client more difficult at trial, and it poses a 
risk to the defendant’s ability to participate in her own defense.  In addition, 
smaller courtrooms may be unable to accommodate these arrangements, 
leaving fewer courtrooms for trials to proceed.  Trials will be at risk of being 
cancelled at the last minute or mid-trial if any participants develop 
symptoms.37 
The burdens of COVID-19 will also likely make it harder to select 
jurors.  Many jurors will opt out of service or fail to show up because of the 
very real health risks of jury service, especially those from communities hit 
hardest by the virus.38  This means the jury pool will not only be smaller, but 
likely less diverse.  As Melanie Wilson argues, “[g]iven that the virus is 
harming people of color in disproportionate numbers, and that white people, 
Republicans and young people are least concerned about spreading and 
contracting the virus, resuming jury trials during the pandemic may 
exacerbate racial disparities in jury pools.”39  Jury service will also be 
unpleasant and anxiety-inducing, requiring people to wear masks for long 
stretches of time.  Other actors in the courtroom will also have to wear masks 
and maintain social distance.  Given these difficulties, judges and jurors will 
be inclined to move trials along quickly, which rarely benefits defendants.40  
And it’s important to note that these are just some of the potential challenges 
 
 35 United States v. Cohn, No. 19-CR-097 GRB, 2020 WL 5050945, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
26, 2020). 
 36 Id. at 7–8 
 37 Gray, supra note 28. 
 38 For a discussion of how certain communities have been devastated by COVID-19, see 
Maria Godoy, What Do Coronavirus Racial Disparities Look Like State by State?, NPR (May 
30, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/05/30/865413079/what-
do-coronavirus-racial-disparities-look-like-state-by-state [https://perma.cc/7R9X-6D93]. 
 39 Wilson, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
 40 Id. at 9–10. 
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courts will face if they try to resume jury trials during the pandemic, which 
is why jury trials are not picking up speed any time soon.41 
Because of these many challenges, some defendants are opting for 
bench trials.  Bench trials are not as difficult to carry out as jury trials for 
many reasons: if they are done in-person, they involve fewer people, and if 
they are done via video, they can be easier to coordinate.  In this sense, they 
pose a much smaller health risk to the parties involved while allowing 
defendants to have their day in court.  It is surprising then that in one 
documented case out of the Eastern District of New York prosecutors 
objected to the defendant’s mid-pandemic request for a bench trial, despite 
the defendant’s health conditions that put him at greater risk of complications 
from COVID-19.42  Prosecutors instead insisted that the defendant continue 
to drag out his case until jury trials resumed.43  The judge ultimately granted 
the defendant’s request for a bench trial.44  But the implications for coercive 
plea bargaining are clear here.  The defendant had decided not to plead guilty 
and to proceed to a bench trial.  The government attempted to block that 
request, which left the defendant to let his case linger while he waited for—
likely unsafe—jury trials to resume.  Had the court not granted the 
defendant’s request for a bench trial, the defendant would have had to plead 
guilty or continue to wait for a jury trial he was terrified to attend because of 
his health issues. 
It is critical to note, though, that bench trials are not a constitutional 
substitute for jury trials, which defendants are entitled to in cases that carry 
a potential sentence of six months or more.45  Although there is some 
evidence that defendants have a greater chance of acquittal at a bench trials,46 
there are many reasons that a defendant may opt for a jury trial.  Even if some 
defendants are willing to accept a bench trial, the right to a jury trial cannot 
be abrogated by the pandemic.  A lack of trials, particularly jury trials, will 
 
 41 Judiciary Issues Report on Restarting Jury Trials, U.S. CTS. (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/combined_jury_trial_post_covid_doc_6.10.20.p
df [https://perma.cc/4CVY-RSUV]. 
 42 United States v. Cohn, No. 19-CR-097 GRB, 2020 WL 5050945, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
26, 2020). 
 43 Id. at *6. 
 44 Id. at *22. 
 45 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73–74 (1970). 
 46 John Gramlich, Only 2% of Federal Criminal Defendants go to Trial, and Most Who 
do are Found Guilty, PEW RSCH CTR. (June 11, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/06/11/only-2-of-federal-criminal-defendants-go-to-trial-and-most-who-do-are-
found-guilty [https://perma.cc/6QA8-7D6T].  In the federal court system in 2018, 38% of 
defendants who went to a bench trial were acquitted compared to only 14% of those who opted 
for a jury trial. Id. 
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ultimately cement plea bargaining as the only means of resolving a criminal 
case. 
2. No Speedy Trial Clock 
Another reason that the lack of trials is so concerning is because in many 
jurisdictions once the pandemic began courts either formally or informally 
stopped the speedy trial clock.  Most states have adopted some speedy trial 
statute, which requires the prosecutor to move forward with the case within 
a specified period of time.47  While many delays are not counted against the 
speedy trial clock,48 a delay should, in general, correspond with some 
heightened chance that the speedy trial clock runs out and the case gets 
dismissed.  Furthermore, there is a constitutional right to a speedy trial under 
the Sixth Amendment.  In Barker v. Wingo, the Court outlined the factors to 
consider in determining post-hoc whether a defendant was denied a speedy 
trial.49  Those factors include the length of delay, the reasons the government 
gives for delay on their end, whether the defendant asserted her rights, and 
any prejudice to the defendant.50  While the length of delay is the triggering 
mechanism, the factors work as a balancing test and require a fact-specific, 
post-hoc analysis of the case.51  As such, a defendant does not enter a criminal 
case with a clear understanding of what constitutes a constitutional speedy 
trial, but the Court does indicate that factors entirely out of the control of the 
state will weigh against the defendant in a speedy trial determination. 
Defendants have not been able to rely on the speedy trial clock during 
the coronavirus crisis as a statutory or constitutional matter, and if prior 
disasters are any indicator, they will likely find that courts will be disinclined 
 
 47 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1) (Mckinney 2020) (stating a motion “must be 
granted where the people are not ready for trial within: (a) six months of the commencement 
of a criminal action is accused of . . . a felony; (b) ninety days of the commencement of a 
criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of . . . a misdemeanor.”); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1382 (West 2010) (stating the court “shall order the action to be dismissed” if “[i]n a felony 
case, when a defendant is not brought to trial within 60 days of the defendant’s arraignment” 
and “when a defendant in a misdemeanor or infraction case is not brought to trial within 30 
days after he or she is arraigned . . . .”).  But see State v. Murphy, 496 A.2d 623, 627 (Me. 
1985) (stating that defendant’s right to a speedy trial is not protected by statute but will be 
determined by the factors set forth in the Supreme Court case of Baker v. Wingo). 
 48 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(4)(a)–(j) (Mckinney 2020) (providing a range 
of reasons that certain time periods during the lifespan of a case are “excludable” from speedy 
trial calculations, including among others, pretrial motion practice, proceedings regarding the 
competency of the defendant, and pretrial discovery demands). 
 49 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 530. 
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to start running the clock in the midst of the crisis.52  First, since the beginning 
of the crisis many state courts put the statutory speedy trial clock on hold.53  
In Massachusetts, for instance, the Supreme Court excluded all COVID-
related delays until late October, including all delays related to pretrial 
release.54  This means that the clock was simply stopped, even for defendants 
who were being jailed while awaiting trial. 
Stopping the speedy trial clock significantly increases the prosecutor’s 
leverage in plea negotiations.  If a defendant objects to the terms of a waiver 
or some other aspect of her plea agreement, the typical option—that is, to 
proceed to trial—is not available.  Second, on the back end, it is unlikely that 
there will be any constitutional speedy trial remedy since COVID-related 
delays are not the fault of the state.  As such, the “reason for the delay” will 
not be attributed to the government.55  Although courts may change their tune 
as the crisis progresses, these circumstances have likely already induced 
many defendants to take pleas, knowing that no trial was in sight.  As the 
waiting game continues, there will undoubtedly be many more. 
In many places it remains unclear as to when trials will resume, and 
even if trials resume in some form in the next several months, there will likely 
be a tremendous backlog of cases.  As a result, defendants once again have 
only two options: let the case linger or plead guilty. 
C. ISSUES WITH ACCESS TO COUNSEL 
Meaningful dialogue with counsel is necessary for a defendant to 
voluntarily and knowingly waive her right to trial.  A defendant is presumed 
to understand the panoply of rights one waives at the time of the plea if she 
 
 52 Patrick Ellard, Learning from Katrina: Emphasizing the Right to a Speedy Trial to 
Protect Constitutional Guarantees in Disasters, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1207, 1221–29 (2007). 
 53 In federal court, several district courts have temporarily stopped the speedy trial clock. 
See, e.g., U.S. N.D.T.X., Special Order No. 13-11: Court Operations Under the Exigent 
Circumstances Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic (April 22, 2020), http://www.txnd.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SO13-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MSK-MHCV] 
(“[T]he ends of justice served by ordering these continuances outweigh the best interests of 
the public and each defendant’s right to a speedy trial.”). 
 54 Commonwealth v. Lougee, 147 N.E.3d 464, 468 (Mass. 2020); see also Superior Court 
Standing Order 9-20: Fourth Updated Protocol Governing Superior Court Operations During 
the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, effective October 1, 2020, https://www.mass.gov/
superior-court-rules/superior-court-standing-order-9-20-fourth-updated-protocol-governing-
superior (noting that all jury trials are delayed until at least October 23, 2020 and that “trial 
continuances order by SCJ are excluded from speedy-trial calculations”). 
 55 Although, as at least one commentator noted after Hurricane Katrina, a lack of 
preparation for inevitable crisis should be held against the state in a speedy trial analysis. 
Patrick Ellard, supra note 52, at 1233–35. 
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consulted with competent counsel.56  Defendants’ indispensable consultation 
with counsel will be a challenge throughout the pandemic, because in-person 
meetings between attorneys and their clients—which is, in many cases, the 
ideal scenario for open dialogue—have halted.57  “Out” clients can call from 
home but many families are home together during the pandemic making it 
difficult to have private conversations.  In addition, the pandemic makes it 
challenging to find spaces outside of the home that provide a private and safe 
place to talk earnestly with a lawyer.  This is also a real challenge for lawyers 
working at home, who struggle to find private locations to have confidential 
conversations. 
For incarcerated clients, the challenges are even more profound.  As 
mentioned above, data shows that those incarcerated in jails and prisons are 
at great risk of catching the virus.  In addition, there is evidence that at least 
some jails and prisons are responding to the risk of COVID-19 by making it 
more difficult for defendants to speak with their attorneys.58 
But communication between lawyers and clients is not the sole 
challenge during this crisis.  Many essential defense attorney functions are 
likely difficult or impossible to carry out.  For instance, defense attorneys 
have an obligation to investigate their clients’ cases, including before 
accepting a plea.59  But how does a defense attorney find hard-to-reach 
witnesses during the pandemic?  How does a defense attorney travel to the 
scene of the crime when travel is restricted or poses a health danger?  Some 
attorneys may be willing to take the risk, but an attorney with a pre-existing 
condition may understandably decide the risk is not worth it.  How do 
 
 56 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (focusing on the critical role of 
competent counsel in defendant’s ability to knowingly and voluntarily accept a guilty plea). 
 57 Chrissy Madjar, Kenneth Hardin, Eric Quandt, & Nathan Wade, 75 Percent of My Job 
is In-Person, But I Can Barely See My Clients, MARSHALL PROJECT (April 17, 2020, 6:00 
AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/17/how-do-i-defend-people-now [https://
perma.cc/NPV5-K6CZ]. 
 58 Kim Kelly, At the Center of the Coronavirus Pandemic, People Inside NYC Jails 
Describe Fear, Confusion and a Lack Of Supplies, THE APPEAL (April 8, 2020), 
https://theappeal.org/new-york-city-jails-coronavirus-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/44T3-
WJXL] (discussing the challenges, including the lack of cleaning phones and public spaces, 
that pretrial detainees face in communicating with the outside world).  In addition, during the 
recent Black Lives Matters protests, some prisons and jails shut down movement and 
communication entirely. Lauren Gill, Federal Bureau of Prisons Locks Down Prisoners and 
Takes Away Communications Amid Protests, THE APPEAL (June 3, 2020), https://theappeal
.org/federal-bureau-of-prisons-locks-down-prisoners-and-takes-away-communications-
amid-protests/ [https://perma.cc/MP6X-S5BG]. 
 59 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTIONS § 4-4.1: DUTY TO 
INVESTIGATE AND ENGAGE INVESTIGATORS (4th ed. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/grou
ps/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/[https://perma.cc/9H4Q-
7YM7]. 
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attorneys share and discuss discovery with clients, both those that are 
incarcerated pretrial and not?  How do clients get access to the many other 
people on a defense team, like paralegals, investigators and mitigation 
specialists?  All of this pretrial work also puts defendants in a much better 
position for plea negotiations. 
These issues are exacerbated by the fact that budgets are being slashed 
for most public defender offices.60  Evidence from the last recession indicates 
that public defense is a low funding priority for states in crisis.61  There are 
also revenue-generating challenges specific to this crisis that will impact 
defense work.  For instance, in some places, funding for defense work is 
generated through the collection of fines paid for traffic offenses.62  With far 
fewer people on the road, this revenue has dropped off a cliff, which will 
likely produce a cascade of negative budget results.  This same budget 
challenge occurred after Hurricane Katrina as well, and states would be wise 
to learn from the lessons of Katrina.  Before Katrina, funding for the public 
defender came largely from parking fines.63  After the hurricane, that source 
of revenue dried up and the number of public defenders in New Orleans 
dropped from thirty-nine to eight.64  It is clear that these economic issues, 
along with the public health restrictions, create difficult and long-lasting 
problems for a defendant’s right to counsel. 
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Crisis can provide opportunity for change and reflection.  One major 
change since the pandemic began is that fewer people are being arrested in 
many jurisdictions, particularly for low-level offenses.65  In addition, there 
have been more frequent grants of clemency and early release of those 
 
 60 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Public Defenders in this State are Told to Slash Budgets 
as Traffic-Ticket Funding Plummets, ABA J. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/public-defenders-are-told-to-slash-budgets-as-traffic-ticket-funding-
plummets [https://perma.cc/PEW4-J57Y]. 
 61 Associated Press, Public Defender Offices are in Crisis, NBC NEWS (June 3, 2009, 8:59 
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31093502/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/public-defende
r-offices-are-crisis/#.XuF3j55KhR0 [https://perma.cc/BBG8-CMVL]. 
 62 See Cassens Weiss, supra note 60. 
 63 Ellard, supra note 53, at 1220. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Weihua Li, Police Arrested Fewer People During Coronavirus Shutdowns – Even 
Fewer Were White, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 2, 2020) (noting that although arrests were 
down, racial disparities in arrest rates worsened during the pandemic), https://www.themar
shallproject.org/2020/06/02/police-arrested-fewer-people-during-coronavirus-shutdowns-
even-fewer-were-white [https://perma.cc/JDB7-85TX]. 
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serving incarceratory sentences than the system normally experiences.66  One 
revelation that could emerge from the pandemic is an understanding that, as 
a society, we do not need to arrest, detain, and incarcerate people at the rates 
we currently do.  The pandemic did not reveal the problems with mass 
incarceration, but it may give us some empirical data to work with in the 
future as we examine the scope of the system. 
The backdrop to the solutions here should be an understanding that the 
broad solution to the problems I address above are to dismiss many more 
cases and, in those that are not dismissed, allow defendants to await 
resolution at home without having to attend live court sessions.  For the cases 
that live on, I offer the following suggestions to lessen the risk of coercive 
plea bargaining.  Some of these I see as temporary fixes that should come 
and go with the virus, but others may prove to be longer lasting.  If 
stakeholders can use this moment as an opportunity for creative problem-
solving, there may be a silver lining to the chaos caused by the crisis. 
A. VIRTUAL JURY TRIALS 
The primary concern I identify above is the lack of jury trials.  There 
are some jurisdictions that have had jury trials during the pandemic by 
seating jurors six feet apart and requiring everyone in the courtroom to wear 
a mask.67  This solution puts people at risk of becoming ill or dying from the 
virus.68  The courts ask citizens to pay too high a price in service of live trials. 
I propose therefore that courts should experiment with trials over Zoom 
or video conference, at least in misdemeanor cases.  I realize this proposal is 
fraught and practically challenging, but the response to the virus 
demonstrated that whole areas of life can be switched over to Zoom or other 
remote services with some planning.  Indeed, lawyers are already thinking 
about this possibility.69  In Texas, at least one civil court has experimented 
 
 66 Associated Press, Illinois Governor Grants Commutations Amid Pandemic, TELEGRAPH 
HERALD (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.telegraphherald.com/coronavirus/article_0ce77ad8-
8bd2-59cb-b62b-ee3df2fd8051.html [https://perma.cc/LF9D-22U8]. 
 67 Shaila Dewan, Jurors, Plea Remove Your Masks: Courtrooms Confront the Pandemic, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/us/coronavirus-jury-trial-
oregon.html [https://perma.cc/Z9PY-EFVQ]. 
 68 However, even when courts do have live trials, those trials must make public either the 
transcript of the trial or a video recording of the trial in order to ensure the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial. Stephen E. Smith, The Right to a Public Trial in the Time 
of COVID-19, 77 WASH. & LEE. REV. ONLINE 1, 11 (2020), https://scholarlycommons.
law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol77/iss1/1 [https://perma.cc/XW7V-JMMK]. 
 69 Matt Reynolds, Could Zoom Jury Trials Become the Norm During the Coronavirus 
Pandemic, ABA J. (May 11, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/could-zoom-
jury-trials-become-a-reality-during-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/REZ6-SFXG]. 
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with a Zoom jury trial70 and another court held a criminal trial in a traffic 
case via videoconference, with jurors being provided iPads to follow the 
proceedings on a dedicated YouTube channel.71 
There are many reasons why Zoom trials are problematic.  As Jenia I. 
Turner chronicles in her article, Remote  Criminal Justice, lawyers and judges 
report many issues with online proceedings, including problems monitoring 
witnesses, glitches with technology that disrupt the proceedings and an 
overall difficulty with presenting cases effectively.72 Other scholars have 
noted that Zoom trials erode the privacy of the participants.73  Indeed, the 
criminal trial in Texas was streamed via YouTube and was observed by 
hundreds of people at any given moment.74  In another trial streamed via 
YouTube, a viewer at home called the court to report that a lawyer had failed 
to redact the defendant’s full social security number in a document he screen-
shared.75  Although trials are typically open to the public, the average 
audience for a run-of-the-mill in-person trial would not have nearly the same 
audience as one broadcast over the internet.  In addition, virtual proceedings 
may lead to bad outcomes for defendants.  For instance, prior studies found 
that defendants got worse results during virtual bail hearings than live bail 
hearings.76 
Recent scholarship, however, pushes back against the idea that virtual 
justice is necessarily inferior.  As Susan Bandes and Neal Feigenson note, 
 
 70 Zoe Schiffer, A Court in Texas is Holding the First Jury Trial by Zoom, THE VERGE 
(May 18, 2020, 2:24 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/18/21262506/texas-court-jury-
trial-zoom-remote-virtual-verdict [https://perma.cc/5JN4-ZANY] (noting that the verdict will 
be non-binding as the court experiments with this format).  According to the judge, it went 
well. Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Is Anywhere Safe for a Jury Trial During the Covid-19 
Pandemic? Try a School Gym., WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-
anywhere-safe-for-a-jury-trial-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-try-a-school-gym-
11589893201 [https://perma.cc/EK2B-H9XX]. 
 71 Katie Hall, Travis County Traffic Case to be Trial Run for Video Chat Juries, THE 
STATESMAN (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.statesman.com/news/20200806/travis-county-traffi
c-case-to-be-trial-run-for-video-chat-juries [https://perma.cc/3PAQ-8DQU]; Jouvenal, supra 
note 27. 
 72 Turner, Remote Criminal Justice, supra note 5, at 21–27.  
 73 Sarah Esther Lageson, The Perils of ‘Zoom Justice,’ THE CRIME Report (Sept. 1, 2020) 
(discussing Lageson’s book Digital Punishment, in which she reports on the harms to 
defendants, witnesses and others whose testimony is broadcast via YouTube and other online 
platforms). 
 74 The author watched parts of the trial on YouTube, where the tally of viewers was 
observable. Id. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Shari Seidman Diamond, Locke E. Bowman, Manyee Wong, & Matthew M. Patton, 
Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 869, 891–98 (2010). 
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our common law system is built on a tradition of live confrontation and, as 
such, an assumption that in-person proceedings are best.77  But virtual trials 
offer opportunities to challenge those assumptions and perhaps even create a 
more open system.78  Matthew Bender goes further and argues that virtual 
proceedings can be done fairly and in accordance to the constitution,79 and 
may even have a number of benefits, including expanding access to counsel 
to underserved communities.80 
So, the jury is out—so to speak—about the advantages or disadvantages 
of Zoom trials.  Stakeholders will find that this moment provides a forced 
experiment with new forms of technology that may or may not work for the 
future.  But my argument here is that offering zoom trials to defendants 
expands the range of options available during this exceptional moment.  To 
avoid coercive pleas, defendants need options, particularly the option to 
proceed to a jury trial. 
But courts should also ramp up their ability to hold bench trials.  Jury 
trials are critical and should not be replaced, but bench trials are easier to 
hold than jury trials and achieve many of the same ends.  They resemble 
hearings, which are being held via video conferencing software with success 
around the country.81  Therefore, although bench trials are not a perfect 
substitute for jury trials, they have been shown to work during this crisis and 
would provide defendants the opportunity to have their case heard.82  To this 
end, judges must commit to increasing the number of bench trials—a 
sentiment echoed by the National Association of Defense Attorneys, which 
takes it a step further and states that court systems should “afford the accused 
the unilateral right to elect a bench trial where that right does not already 
exist.”83 
From a procedural and constitutional standpoint, trials are the backbone 
of the criminal justice system.  Without trials, defendants are left with only 
the plea offer on the table, which is an unfair position for them and an 
untenable position for a system meant to provide an opportunity to air the 
facts of a case.  By removing trials, the public and adversarial nature of the 
 
 77 Bandes & Feigenson, supra note 5, at 3–4, 7. 
 78 Id. at 68–70. 
 79 Bender, supra note 5, at 40–46. 
 80 Id. 
 81 For instance, the actress Lori Loughlin recently had a plea hearing via Zoom. Kate 
Taylor, Lori Loughlin Pleads Guilty via Zoom in College Admissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 
22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/22/us/lori-loughlin-pleads-guilty.html?search
ResultPosition=2 [https://perma.cc/2DJP-8CP6]. 
 82 See Reynolds, supra note 69. 
 83 NACDL, supra note 29, at 1. 
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criminal justice system breaks down. It does not have to be this way: 
proceedings over phone or video conferencing software can ensure that trials 
continue and remain open to the public. Plea bargaining should not be the 
only solution. 
B. STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN PLEA BARGAINING 
Judges have an important role to play in ensuring the fairness of plea 
bargains during this crisis, and there are several ways that this can happen.  
First, judges should be vigilant in seeking out unsavory waivers.  Judge 
Breyer in the Northern District of California wrote a powerful opinion about 
the injustice of asking defendants to waive their right to request 
compassionate release, which should serve as a model for other judges who 
confront these same waivers.84  But more than that, judges should scour plea 
agreements for novel waivers that relate to the COVID-19 crisis and 
interrogate their purpose before accepting them.85 
Second, judges should be wary of all plea waivers during this crisis.  
Defendants are under more pressure than normal to plea bargain, and waivers 
of appeal and other rights should be excluded from these agreements.  Judges 
should encourage and push for the full exchange of discovery before any 
pleas are taken.  They should take additional care to develop a factual record 
that reflects a crime and a voluntary and knowing plea on the part of the 
defendant.  These are the inherent requirements of a judge under any 
circumstance, but the crisis asks us to confront the role of a judge in the rote 
nature of the plea process.  During the coronavirus crisis, judges must closely 
supervise the plea process for signs of coercion, otherwise it will occur.  
Unfortunately, early signs indicate that judges are not taking extra time to 
assure that pleas are knowing and voluntary during this extraordinary time.86 
Third, although judges only have so much power over the terms of the 
plea at the front-end, on the backend they can be more open to defendants’ 
claims of coercion during appeals and other post-conviction proceedings.  A 
plea must be taken voluntarily and free from coercion.  Courts tend to cabin 
the scope of voluntariness,87 but the crisis should inform the legal conception 
 
 84 See United States v. Sembrano, No. 19-cr-00651-CRB-1, 2020 WL 3161003, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. May 28, 2020). 
 85 It is also worth noting that bar associations can play a role here by formally ruling that 
certain waivers are unethical, thereby providing guidance to lawyers and judges. 
 86 Turner, Remote Criminal Justice, supra note 5, at 61 (finding that in observations of 59 
plea hearings across eighteen different Texas courts, judges did not inquire into the factual 
basis of the guilty plea 83% of the time and did not inquire into the voluntariness of the plea 
39% of the time). 
 87 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978). 
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of voluntariness.  Is it voluntary to accept a plea when the alternative was 
potential death in a prison or jail? 
Finally, individual judges and court systems should count delays caused 
by the pandemic toward any statutory or constitutional speedy trial clock.  
Courts have allowed speedy trial delays during and after other disasters as 
well,88 but unlike a hurricane, which is a discrete event, we have no idea how 
long this crisis will last.  Without a vaccine, it is likely the problems 
associated with the coronavirus will be with us for some time, making these 
issues surrounding plea bargaining a prolonged problem, not a temporary 
one.  The burden of this crisis should not fall on defendants.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo explained that the Speedy Trial provision 
of the Sixth Amendment was meant to serve three main interests: to prevent 
oppressive pretrial incarceration, to reduce the anxiety associated with a 
pending charge for the defendant, and to minimize the possibility that the 
defense case would be impaired.89  All of these interests are implicated 
during the pandemic.  Moreover, running the speedy trial clock during the 
pandemic does not benefit defendants involved in serious cases, because in 
many places the speedy trial clock does not apply to murder or similarly 
serious charges.  As a result, it is unlikely that defendants in serious cases 
will receive a windfall from running the clock during the pandemic.  Many 
misdemeanors could be dismissed, but the alternative—to have these cases 
drag on or result in mass plea bargains—is neither necessary for public safety 
nor positive for the integrity of the system. 
At the very least, courts should run the clock on the detention of those 
incarcerated pretrial.  In any case that is not resolved by a plea within a short 
window, the defendant should be released, even if the case continues.  
Releasing defendants pretrial is made all the more critical because of the high 
rates of COVID-19 in jails.90  But this should not be an opportunity to gouge 
defendants on the fees of ankle monitors or other forms of home surveillance.  
Again, the costs of our current disaster should flow to the state and not the 
defendant. 
There is a real risk that judges, faced with mounting dockets and no 
clear end date to the crisis, will pressure defendants to plead guilty.  Judges 
should resist this temptation.  The risks of coercive plea bargaining are 
significantly heightened during the COVID-19 crisis.  And the judge plays a 
unique role in warding off false and unfair pleas. 
 
 88 Ellard, supra note 52, at 1221–29. 
 89 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972). 
 90 See Park & Meagher, supra note 2. 
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III. SILVER LININGS OF THE CRISIS 
Progressive changes have occurred during the pandemic.  Arrests are 
lower in many jurisdictions.91  Governors are granting clemency to 
incarcerated individuals.92  Many people are being released from jails and 
prisons on compassionate release or for other reasons not related to the end 
of their sentences.93  So far, these changes have not produced an attendant 
rise in crime.94 
On a broad level, the pandemic could expose some of the dysfunctions 
of the criminal system while also mitigating others.  As Benjamin Levin 
explained in Criminal Law in Crisis, this “exceptional” moment “offer[s] an 
important opportunity to recognize the cruelty, inhumanity, and 
destructiveness that define U.S. criminal policy in ‘normal’ times.”95  He 
argues that the virus will force us to look more closely at the conditions of 
jails and prisons, even when the country is not in the midst of a crisis.  
Perhaps, too, the virus will force judges to think not just about the length of 
the sentence but of the nature of the sentence. 
Julia Simon-Kerr has also written about the potential benefits of having 
witnesses wear masks during criminal trials in a system that demands 
witnesses “perform” credibility.96  If everyone is masked, it forces 
participants to focus more on the oral testimony of the witness rather than on 
their perceptions of the witness, which are often infused with bias.97  Others 
have written about how this moment might be an opportunity for progressive 
 
 91 Associated Press, Crime Drops Around the World as COVID-19 Keeps People Inside, 
CHI. SUN TIMES (Apr. 11, 2020, 9:45 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/coronavirus
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[https://perma.cc/624Y-46UD]. 
 92 Associated Press, supra note 67. 
 93 Professor Doug Berman is keeping track of many of the compassionate release grants 
on his blog, Sentencing Law and Policy. Doug Berman, Still More COVID-Influenced Grants 
of Sentence Reductions Using § 3582(c)(1)(A), with waivers of exhaustion/waiting period, 
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 94 See Neil MacFarquhar & Serge F. Kovaleski, A Pandemic Bright Spot: In Many Places, 
Less Crime, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/coronaviru
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 95 Levin, supra note 5, at 2. 
 96  Simon-Kerr, supra note 5, at 161. 
 97 Id. at 168–69. 
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prosecutors to successfully push for reforms that shrink the criminal system 
and the current rates of incarceration.98 
There may be benefits to the plea process itself during this time.  Plea 
bargaining has always happened in the shadows, and such shadowed plea 
bargaining results in less data about the plea process. 99  In addition, during 
appellate litigation, we are often left to rely on the word of the parties about 
the nature of the promises made before the agreement was put into writing.  
With lawyers not able to meet in courtroom hallways to discuss pleas, it 
seems likely that more plea bargaining will occur by email and text, or by 
Zoom or video, which may be recorded.  Indeed, lawyers already report that 
the plea process has slowed down as quick hallway discussions have been 
eliminated in favor of other forms of communication.100  This could have the 
salutary effect of creating records of the plea process, giving us more data 
both for individual appeals and for the study of the plea system. 
In addition, recent work on negotiation and plea bargaining indicates 
that although there are many drawbacks to negotiating over email or text, 
there may be hidden benefits, especially for people who are bargaining from 
a position of lesser power,101 which is often the case for defense attorneys.  
Email negotiation can “undermine existing power dynamics and encourage 
direct confrontation because it stops one individual from seizing control of 
the discussion and suppressing the view of another.”102  By forcing a layer of 
physical separation between the parties, the coronavirus could, in some 
instances, benefit defendants in the negotiation process.  But to be clear, as 
described above, defendants generally operate from a position of weakness 
in these negotiations, and this incremental dismantling of a power structure 
is but small boon in an otherwise overwhelming system. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been a hundred years since we confronted a crisis like the one we 
now face.  And it is true that this crisis could exacerbate many of the problems 
we see with plea bargaining—particularly its coercive nature—but there is 
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also hope.  Our response to this crisis may create space for new solutions.  
By closely watching how stakeholders respond to this moment, we may see 
opportunities to reshape much of the criminal justice system. 
Stakeholders should be wary of falling back on plea bargaining as the 
solution to the problems posed by the coronavirus.  Coercive plea bargains 
are a risk even when the system is running smoothly.  For the reasons I 
outline here, the risk of coercive pleas is heightened.  Lawyers, judges and 
court administrators have a responsibility to protect against the use of such 
pleas. 
 
